Hounslow Emergency Response by Millard, Daniel C et al.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) Interactive Qualifying Projects
June 2018
Hounslow Emergency Response
Daniel C. Millard
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Jacob M. Tomkinson
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Leif Galen Sahyun
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Sizhuo Li
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Interactive Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Millard, D. C., Tomkinson, J. M., Sahyun, L. G., & Li, S. (2018). Hounslow Emergency Response. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all/598
Building Community Resilience in 
Hounslow Using Community Engagement 
 
An Interactive Qualifying Project Report 
submitted to the Faculty of the 
WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Bachelor of Science 
 
by 
Sizhuo Li 
Daniel Millard 
Leif Sahyun 
Jacob Tomkinson 
 
Date: 20 June 2018 
 
Report Submitted to: 
Twm Palmer 
London Borough of Hounslow Contingency Planning Unit 
 
Professors James Hanlan and Gbetonmasse Somasse 
Worcester Polytechnic Institute 
 
This report represents work of WPI undergraduate students submitted to the faculty as evidence of a degree 
requirement. WPI routinely publishes these reports on its web site without editorial or peer review. For more 
information about the projects program at WPI, see http://www.wpi.edu/Academics/Projects.  
i 
 
Abstract 
In response to disasters, people often wish to help victims in any way possible. While this 
display of human empathy is heartwarming, but if not coordinated, it can cause problems in 
emergency response. The goal of this project was to improve community engagement and the 
use of voluntary contributions in the London Borough of Hounslow before, during, and after an 
emergency. Towards this goal, the project team interviewed established experts in disaster 
response, local government officers, and representatives of local businesses, faith groups, and 
voluntary groups. Using information from these interviews, the team developed a set of 
recommendations for our sponsor, the Contingency Planning Unit of the London Borough of 
Hounslow, to improve community engagement and volunteer management. 
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Executive Summary 
This research was conducted at the request of the London Borough of Hounslow’s 
Contingency Planning Unit (CPU) with the goal of improving the management of voluntary 
contributions, including materials and time, and improving community engagement before, 
during, and after an emergency. After providing a literature review, this report details results 
from interviews with established experts in the field of disaster research, local authorities within 
the borough, and local stakeholders in Hounslow. Along with the results of these interviews, this 
report summarizes what was found to be the best current practices of volunteer management and 
community engagement and concludes with a set of recommendations for the Contingency 
Planning Unit. 
The Phenomenon of Convergence in Disasters 
When people are in need, particularly after a large disaster, an occurrence known as 
convergence takes place. This phenomenon stems from the human desire to help those in need 
and is defined by Fritz (1957) as the “informal, spontaneous movement of people, messages, and 
supplies towards the disaster area.” While an impressive manifestation of human empathy, 
convergence can also create disorganization and chaos when authorities are not prepared for a 
massive outpouring of support. This support was seen in the image below (Figure 1) in which 
thousands of people showed up on the site of the Grenfell Tower Fire, resulting in a chaotic 
environment. 
Figure 1: Personnel Convergence at the Grenfell 
Tower Fire (France-Presse, 2017) 
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Convergence is divided into informational, material, and personnel convergence (see 
Table 1). In order to manage convergence as a whole, an emergency planner must manage each 
type of convergence. In particular, personnel convergence with untrained volunteers can cause 
chaos and an emergency planner should be able to manage the different types of volunteers that 
could appear during an emergency, including established volunteer groups and individual 
spontaneous volunteers. In order to manage established volunteer groups, Buckle, Marsh, and 
Smale (2003) suggest emergency planners invite established groups to “Recovery Committee” 
meetings. In order to manage individual volunteers, Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer (2015) 
suggest that government agencies should establish a problem-solving structure for handling 
volunteers rather than trying to handle them via a top-down system. 
Table 1: Types of Convergence 
Informational Convergence The influx of communications, both public and private, related 
to a disaster 
Material Convergence The accumulation of material goods donated to disaster response 
Personnel Convergence The spontaneous movement of volunteers to a disaster site 
Motivation and Methodology 
 Because of the difficulties involved with managing volunteers in an emergency, the 
Contingency Planning Unit asked us to develop a set of recommendations that will help them 
prepare to address these issues in Hounslow. In addition to these recommendations, this project 
also produced a database of groups in the community that would provide volunteers and 
donations in an emergency in order to improve coordination between the CPU and established 
groups. 
 The goal of this project was to improve community engagement and management of 
voluntary contributions before, during, and after an emergency in Hounslow. In order to achieve 
this goal, we accomplished three intermediate objectives: 
1. Identify best practices in volunteer management and community engagement; 
2. Evaluate how local authorities in Hounslow and other government agencies in and around 
London currently engage with the community, businesses, volunteers, and faith groups in 
the event of emergencies; 
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3. Assess the needs and capabilities of local stakeholders in handling volunteers, materials, 
and other donations during emergencies. 
 For each of our objectives, we identified and interviewed key individuals, then 
determined common themes in their responses. In order to assess best practices for community 
engagement, we interviewed academic experts around the globe. In order to evaluate local 
authorities, we interviewed key local officers. Finally, in order to assess the needs and 
capabilities of local stakeholders, we interviewed leaders in the community. 
Best Practices 
In our interviews with experts in the field of emergency management, we identified five 
common themes within best practices for community engagement (see Figure 2). According to 
Professor David McEntire, in order to maximize collaboration, authorities should communicate 
and network with the voluntary sector before an emergency. Established communication can also 
be used to improve coordination during an improvised response, such as the evacuation of 
Manhattan during 9/11. Training and certifying volunteers can also improve coordination 
between volunteers and local authorities. According to Professor Thomas Drabek, the scope and 
type of convergence can only be determined after an emergency, but emergency managers 
should plan for it to occur. Finally, the media plays an important and perhaps crucial role in 
convergence. Thus, planning how emergency management will interact with the media can help 
manage convergence and improve community engagement. 
vi 
 
 
Current Practices 
 Current practices for community engagement and management of voluntary contributions 
include direct two-way communication through informal contacts, communication via 
committees and social media, and empowering the community through training. The 
Metropolitan Police use informal contacts to engage with the community as well as a widely 
followed Twitter account and both the police and the Community Partnerships Unit rely on 
various forums in Hounslow to engage with the community. Both the police and Community 
Partnerships Unit empower the community by providing training in important skills to 
community members. In the case of emergency response and recovery volunteers, training them 
would improve both their abilities and coordination. The current practices of both the police and 
the Community Partnerships Unit agreed with what the literature review and academic 
interviews revealed to be the best practices for community engagement. 
Figure 2: Best practices in volunteer management and community 
engagement from expert interviews 
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Needs and Capabilities of Local Stakeholders 
 The needs and capabilities of local stakeholders were largely consistent between the 
different groups. Most of the groups we interviewed were adamant about helping in emergencies, 
and many needed similar things from the CPU to be able do so. These groups expressed a need 
for organization and guidance from the CPU, the development of a relationship, and finally 
scenario training. As for the capabilities of the stakeholders, every group offered different 
resources, but there were three main resources offered: volunteers, space, and donations. Some 
groups offered other capabilities; for example, the Gurdwara Sri Guru Singh Sabha offered to set 
up a collection for monetary donations and offered to coordinate volunteers. 
Taking into account the best practices, current practices, and needs and capabilities of 
local stakeholders, the project team compiled a set of recommendations for the Hounslow 
Contingency Planning Unit to improve community engagement and management of voluntary 
contributions (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Recommendations 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 After an emergency, volunteers are almost guaranteed to gather at the scene with their 
numbers perhaps even reaching into the thousands after large disasters. For example, in the 
2010-11 floods in Queensland, Australia, over 100,000 people attempted to volunteer through 
Volunteering Queensland (Barraket, Keast, Newton, Walters, & James, 2013). In addition to 
volunteer labor, people also donate money and supplies. After Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the 
American Red Cross helped distribute over 4.5 million meals and 1.6 million relief items 
(American Red Cross, 2017). Unfortunately, although these volunteers and supplies are helpful 
when managed properly, the magnitude of the support can overwhelm managing organizations. 
Unsolicited donations and volunteers can inundate response organizations to the point where 
volunteers interfere with the access and efficiency of trained emergency response personnel, and 
inappropriate donations consume valuable organization time for their management or disposal 
(Whittaker, McLennan, & Handmer, 2015). 
 On June 14, 2017, a massive fire broke out at the Grenfell Tower in the London borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea that took over 24 hours to put out, claimed over seventy-two lives, 
and left over three hundred residents homeless. The response to this disaster was incredible: 
more than 10,000 people volunteered. Unfortunately, the number of volunteers and the amount 
of material and monetary donations swamped the capabilities of local volunteer organizations 
and emergency agencies. Given the difficulties the borough of Kensington and Chelsea faced, 
many boroughs, including Hounslow, are reexamining how they might better manage 
spontaneous volunteers and donations of money and materials in major emergencies. 
 While the Contingency Planning Unit (CPU) of the London Borough of Hounslow (see 
Appendix A) has already created protocols for how to respond to specific types of emergencies, 
the Grenfell Tower Fire incident raised concern about how effective these protocols may be in 
managing the enormous numbers of spontaneous volunteers and donations likely in a major 
emergency. The goal of this project is to evaluate the borough's current protocols with the help of 
the CPU and propose possible ways to improve or revise those protocols. In our efforts toward 
this goal, our team first gathered information on volunteer management from published sources 
and reviewed the current protocols and practices put in place by the CPU. We then proceeded to 
interview local officers, experts in emergency response, and local stakeholders, including 
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volunteer groups, to collect their opinions on the current practices both inside and outside of 
Hounslow, what resources stakeholders need and what they can offer, and what new protocols 
might need to be put in place. We identified stakeholders in Hounslow to interview both through 
our own research and through recommendations from our sponsor. While conducting these 
interviews, we assessed the borough’s current protocols. Finally, after our assessment of the 
protocols, we created a set of recommendations to the CPU for improving community 
engagement and we created a database of voluntary groups with resources available in an 
emergency. 
 Our recommendations were divided into categories concerning engagement with 
established groups, engagement with the community at-large, and management of spontaneous 
and emergent behavior (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Recommendations 
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Chapter II: Background 
 In this section, we first look at the phenomenon of convergence and its effects. Then, we 
explore the different types of volunteers and how best to manage them, referencing previous 
research. We study the Grenfell Tower disaster and note the management of volunteers and 
material donations there. Finally, we relate these topics to our project. 
2.1 Convergence 
When people are in need, particularly after a disaster of considerable proportions, an 
occurrence known as convergence takes place. This phenomenon stems from the human desire to 
help those in need and is defined by Fritz (1957) as the “informal, spontaneous movement of 
people, messages, and supplies towards the disaster area.” While an impressive manifestation of 
human empathy, convergence can also create disorganization and chaos when authorities are not 
prepared for a massive outpouring of support. 
The informal, spontaneous volunteers who respond to emergencies often learn about the 
incident through the media, which may overplay such events. Many individuals simply show up 
to the site of the emergency and try to help by donating either their time or resources. For both 
small and large emergencies, the appearance of large numbers of people and large amounts of 
material goods can overwhelm the authorities in charge, who may not have anticipated so many 
volunteers and donations. As a result, time and money could be wasted trying to incorporate 
unexpected volunteers and disposing of donated materials that exceed what is necessary, 
especially clothes, food, and other goods (Auf der Heide, 2003). 
         The professional literature distinguishes between material and personnel convergence. 
Material convergence consists of material goods donated or lent to the disaster response and 
includes items ranging from food goods and medical supplies, which may be expired, to clothing 
and paper goods. Such items can be critical or useless in a disaster relief effort, depending on the 
type of emergency (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, Van Wassenhove, Wachtendorf, 2012). Clear 
communication from the authorities and relief groups to those wishing to donate is essential to 
ensure that victims receive the types of goods they need, to reduce the amount of wasted 
donations and time, and to conserve the resources required to manage donations (Auf der Heide, 
2003). According to Holguín-Veras et al. (2012), the primary cause of material convergence is 
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that individuals will send supplies readily available to them with the mentality that “anything and 
everything could be of use.” This can lead to an unwieldy supply of low priority and nonpriority 
materials while much needed high priority materials may still be scarce. 
         Material convergence is closely tied to personnel convergence which consists of 
spontaneous volunteers appearing at a disaster site and stems from individuals wishing to help 
those in need and reduce the dangers of hazardous situations. According to Martel, Montgomery, 
Neatherlin, and Wako (2014), people will always take action when informed of a danger, even if 
not given direction by authorities. Undirected volunteers can cripple the ability of authorities and 
trained responders to provide relief and aid and can unintentionally make the volunteers an 
obstacle and potentially a liability. While the physical presence of the volunteers, and their 
modes of transportation such as automobile, may impede the ability of trained responders to 
work, their needs and activities can also place logistic stress on the area. After all, volunteers 
require resources themselves, which increases the demand for lodging, food, toiletries, 
electricity, and cell phone service. The increased demand for electricity and phone service can 
strain the local service capacities, possibly limiting online communication and the use of 
electrical appliances and further impeding the local responders and authorities (Cone, 2003). 
         Personnel convergence also relates to the impact of the media on public perception of the 
situation. The media can present an incomplete or distorted report of the situation at the site of 
the emergency. For example, the media may report on only select groups, such as schools, that 
were affected by a particular disaster, which results in overwhelming amounts of school-related 
donations. With skewed media coverage, people can easily overlook the aid required by other 
groups (Wenchuan, 2008). According to Holguín-Veras et al. (2012), one possible method to 
control material convergence relates to the media as well. The media is a powerful 
communication channel, and by carefully informing the media and the public before mass 
coverage of an emergency, potential volunteers can receive a more accurate representation of the 
situation. If implemented successfully, such an effort encourages the donation of more 
appropriate materials and discourages unneeded gifts. With proper management and use of the 
media, personnel convergence becomes more successful as volunteers can be organized 
efficiently and address the appropriate issues. 
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2.2 Use of Different Types of Volunteers 
Volunteers will inevitably converge at the site of an emergency, but how can an 
emergency management agency effectively use the different types of volunteers that show up? 
According to the Disaster Research Center typology, which is based on observation and 
assessment of volunteer groups in many different disasters, there are four types of volunteer 
groups: established, expanding, extending, and emergent (Quarantelli, 1994). Established groups 
exist before an emergency and use protocols they have in place during the emergency to perform 
tasks related to their organizational identity. Take the Red Cross as an example: they have health 
care experts who can help once an emergency occurs. Expanding and extending volunteer groups 
exist before an emergency but change either their organizational structure or the tasks and roles 
of their personnel during an emergency (see Table 2). Emergent groups do not exist before an 
emergency; they form during an emergency to handle tasks and roles other groups do not fulfill. 
Table 2: Four types of volunteer groups (Quarantelli, 1994) 
 Structure 
Old New 
Tasks & 
Roles 
Old Type I: Established Type II: Expanding 
New Type III: Extending Type IV: Emergent 
2.2.1 Established Volunteer Groups 
The way emergency management agencies interact with established groups is necessarily 
different from how they interact with individual volunteers or emergent groups because 
established volunteer groups have defined organizations, roles, and hierarchies that enable them 
to interact with emergency response agencies. Additionally, emergency management agencies 
can include established groups in emergency plans and planning activities prior to the 
emergency. 
The key factor in managing established groups is communication. Several approaches 
exist to communicate with established groups. Drabek and McEntire (2003) note the command 
and control management models that dominate in emergency planning and response and tend to 
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favor top-down communications. Buckle, Marsh, and Smale (2003) emphasize that management 
agencies need a bidirectional model of communication in order to remain aware of the needs of 
the community. The communication need not be formal. For example, Weick, Sutcliffe, and 
Obstfeld (2008) recommend a wide informal communication network for emergency 
management, based on high reliability organizations. 
Buckle, Marsh, and Smale (2003) give specific recommendations to improve 
communication with established groups. The authors suggest emergency management agencies 
organize training and certification for established groups and invite them to “Recovery 
Committee” meetings. The government agencies such as the CPU should recognize the training 
and certification to legitimize the volunteer organizations and understand their value. The 
training should be visible, paid for, and up to date in relevant technical areas. The recovery 
meetings should convene at least twice per year and should include workshops. Emergency 
management agencies and established groups should also hold regular meetings to spread 
information and should test emergency communication channels regularly (Buckle, Marsh, and 
Smale, 2003). 
2.2.2 Expanding and Extending Volunteer Groups 
Expanding and extending volunteer groups exist prior to an emergency but change their 
structure or role to adapt to a particular unique emergency situation (Quarantelli, 1994). 
Expanding groups are volunteer organizations that exist prior to an emergency but take on a new 
structure to handle the emergency. Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer (2015) list the Salvation 
Army as an example of an expanding group. The Salvation Army is structured to provide food 
and clothing to those in need when there is no emergency, but traditionally provides disaster 
relief as well. During an emergency, the Salvation Army expands its structure to include 
additional active volunteers and to provide relief to victims. Extending groups are organizations 
that exist prior to an emergency that do not traditionally engage in emergency response but take 
on additional roles during the emergency. These include local businesses with a stake in the 
emergency as well as sporting clubs and social organizations active in the community (Whittaker 
et al, 2015). 
Expanding and extending groups typically seek to work with established groups and 
authorities, which facilitates emergency management (Whittaker et al, 2015). Since these groups 
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exist prior to an emergency, the emergency management agency could possibly identify, in 
advance of an emergency, those local organizations with potential to become expanding or 
extending groups. Once identified, emergency management agencies could include these groups 
in emergency planning activities and treat them similarly to established groups with additional 
flexibility to account for potential changes in structure or role. 
2.2.3 Emergent Volunteer Groups 
Prior research has firmly established that, after an emergency, new volunteer groups will 
inevitably appear (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985). These emergent volunteer groups fill 
perceived gaps in official emergency response and recovery. Officials find it more difficult to 
interact with emergent volunteer groups than with established, expanding, or extending groups 
for two reasons. First, there is no established dialogue between officials and emergent groups. 
Second, this type of group usually has a flat organizational structure with little to no structured 
leadership or management (Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985). Drabek and McEntire (2003) 
observe that the top-down command and control systems that are most common among both 
official emergency response organizations and established voluntary groups are not optimal for 
engaging with emergent groups. 
In addition to changing their structure to accommodate emergent groups, emergency 
management agencies can take steps to improve communication in spite of the initial absence of 
dialogue. Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer (2015) suggest that emergency management 
agencies follow the example of the Amstelland Safety Region (ASR) in the Netherlands and ask 
emergency responders to identify ‘natural leaders’ within emergent groups as soon as possible in 
an evolving emergency. Emergency responders should provide the ‘natural leaders’ with 
information about the emergency and include them in planning meetings (Whittaker et al, 2015). 
Legitimating volunteer activities is a powerful tool that officials can use to increase beneficial 
volunteerism. Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer (2015) describe how the ASR expects 
officials to legitimate volunteer activities, providing the volunteer groups with extra access, 
information, and identifiable clothing or insignias. Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) also mention 
that recognizing and legitimizing emergent volunteer organizations will increase the lifespan and 
utility of those organizations. 
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Emergent groups usually disintegrate after they complete their tasks in an emergency 
(Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985). Occasionally, these groups will grow into permanent 
organizations either to perform the same tasks they performed during the emergency but on a 
larger scale, to seek aid for recovering after the emergency, or to seek legal or political action 
against those thought to be responsible for the emergency. Consequently, officials are often wary 
of emergent groups, fearing such groups will blame the authorities for their handling of 
emergency response and recovery efforts, which may damage the reputation of the authorities 
whether or not they were at fault. Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) emphasize the importance of 
keeping the public, particularly emergent volunteer groups, informed. They observe that, when 
authorities refuse to communicate with emergent groups, which are usually benign, even 
beneficial, the lack of communication can create an atmosphere of distrust that causes the once 
benign group to turn against the authorities and seek sometimes inappropriate post-emergency 
action. 
2.2.4 Spontaneous Volunteers 
During an emergency, government agencies and non-profit organizations need volunteers 
to aid disaster victims, rebuild communities, educate the public, and prepare for future 
emergencies. Ideally, volunteers would affiliate with established volunteer organizations before a 
disaster and be able to fill needed roles as necessary. Affiliation brings many advantages to 
volunteers, including training and the ability to fill vital roles quickly and effectively when 
needed. Ideal volunteers in emergency management systems are flexible, self-sufficient, aware of 
risks, and willing to follow instructions from local emergency management experts. However, 
not all volunteers affiliate with a volunteer group. As opposed to the groups described above, 
spontaneous volunteers are individuals who seek to help on impulse and who are unaffiliated 
with a group at the time of an emergency (McLennan, Molloy, & Handmer, 2016). Spontaneous 
volunteers may seek to join an established group, form an emergent group, or act alone. 
Researchers have categorized spontaneous volunteers into six different types, as described in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3: Six types of spontaneous volunteers (Corporation for National and Community Service, 
2015) 
Helpers People who have come to help victims or responders in some way 
Returnees People who lived in the disaster-impacted area but were evacuated 
The Anxious People from outside the impacted area who are attempting to obtain 
information about family and friends 
The Curious People who are motivated primarily to view the destruction left in the 
wake of the disaster 
Supporters People who gather to display flags and banners encouraging and 
expressing gratitude to emergency workers 
Exploiters People who try to use the disaster for personal gain or profit 
 Whittaker et al. (2015) suggest that, since spontaneous volunteers often appear at the 
scene of an emergency, but do not do so reliably, emergency management agencies have 
difficulty planning for them. Spontaneous volunteers are particularly averse to the typical 
command and control structure mentioned earlier because it assumes that untrained citizens are 
inept and that ad hoc volunteering is counterproductive. That is why government agencies should 
establish a problem-solving structure for handling volunteers rather than a top-down system. 
Since volunteers are highly likely to converge on an emergency, it is possible to set up a protocol 
for adding isolated volunteers to a larger volunteer system. For example, the ASR has a set 
protocol for absorbing spontaneous volunteers in the event of an emergency. 
2.3 The Grenfell Tower Fire 
The Grenfell Tower Fire in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) was a 
significant recent emergency. Several boroughs including Hounslow, responded with mutual aid 
to this fire that left seventy-two people dead and more than three hundred homeless (Rawlinson, 
2017). Hounslow’s CPU wants to learn from the mistakes and problems that occurred during the 
fire to help improve community resilience and emergency response. Here, we will identify 
failures in management of convergence and volunteers after the Grenfell Tower Fire and relate 
them to previously discussed research. 
The Grenfell Tower Fire was a major disaster for the city of London. Not only was the 
fire ablaze for over twenty-four hours, but there were seventy-two fatalities and hundreds of 
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people who lost their homes. This disaster merited emergency response from multiple 
surrounding boroughs. Despite the large number of responders, many people, including Theresa 
May, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, openly expressed immense dissatisfaction with 
how the Kensington and Chelsea Council handled the emergency response (Sanderson, 2017). A 
volunteer at the fire complained about the disorganization, saying he was shocked not to see any 
visible council officials (Bowcott, 2017). People expect leaders to be visible in a crisis, to 
provide clear direction, show support for victims, and communicate with and coordinate between 
themselves and other groups (Boin and Hart, 2003). 
The efforts of volunteers after the fire were chaotic and overwhelming, especially at first. 
After a few weeks, the volunteer groups became much more organized. Unfortunately, this has 
largely been criticized as too much time to get organized and that time and effort could have 
been used more efficiently. For example, a group of general practitioners (GPs) set up makeshift 
health desks and were coordinated by London Central & West Unscheduled Care Collaborative 
(LCWUCC). This GPs group called themselves the "Grenfell Medics". The Grenfell Medics 
began to cooperate with the British Red Cross, the Grenfell Muslim Response Unit, and 
government agencies such as the RBKC Council, but only after the Grenfell Medics had become 
organized themselves. This is a problem because the informal structure of emergent groups often 
baffles other organizations who try to communicate and work with them (Stallings and 
Quarantelli, 1985). After a couple of weeks, the Grenfell Medics moved their services to a 
community center facility called The Curve. This facility provided victims with shelter, food, 
and clothing, and granted psychological and counseling services to those who needed it. The 
volunteers working at The Curve focused on enabling the victims to become self-sufficient again 
(Zulueta, 2018). This example illustrates that emergency response agencies, volunteer 
organizations, and other stakeholders need to try to anticipate and plan for some of the problems 
associated with the formation of these emergent groups and help them to establish themselves 
more quickly so that they can function efficiently and helpfully in the event of an emergency. 
Material donations also arrived in abundance at the site of the Grenfell Tower Fire. The 
volunteer organizations and faith groups working on the disaster relief received more donations 
than they were able to manage efficiently as well as the wrong types of donations (Williams, 
2018). Holguín-Veras et al. (2012) mentioned that the problem with donations converging at an 
emergency site is that they are often unnecessary and create havoc for those who respond. There 
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were also a lot of perishable goods, like food, that had to be organized and distributed. These 
goods require additional management resources because, as Kendra and Wachtendorf (2001) 
point out, unsupervised donations of perishable food can pose health risks. 
In addition to donations, the RBKC and the local volunteer center both received an 
overwhelming number of individuals who wanted to offer help. The RBKC and volunteer center 
did not acknowledge these offers of help which annoyed volunteers and likely decreased their 
effectiveness and willingness to volunteer. It is important to acknowledge volunteers and grant 
them legitimacy as it allows them to assist and can increase their ease of identifiability to victims 
(Whittaker, McLennan, and Handmer, 2015). Granting accreditation and legitimacy increases 
volunteer motivation and extends the lifespan of volunteer groups (Stallings and Quarantelli, 
1985). The issues observed in managing convergence and volunteers surrounding the Grenfell 
Tower Fire not only damaged efficiency in helping with the fire, but also public trust in the 
RBKC. Due to the Council’s handling of the crisis and lack of acknowledgement of volunteers, 
demonstrators tried to storm the Council offices in protest (Bowcott, 2017). This is an instance of 
Stallings and Quarantelli’s (1985) observation that while most emergent groups usually avoid 
political associations, if they feel they are being snubbed they will take political action. 
2.4 Background Conclusion 
 The Grenfell Tower Fire had a significant influence on this project as it motivated 
emergency planning agencies around England to improve plans to handle both convergence and 
volunteers. The Grenfell Tower Fire highlighted the need to focus on planning for the 
management of volunteers and donations in the event of an emergency, which is the topic of this 
project. The issues of convergence and volunteers played an important role in the Grenfell 
incident. The magnitude of volunteer efforts proved difficult to manage, which allowed chaos to 
ensue. The disaster area saw material, informational, and personnel convergence, all of which 
came in overwhelming quantities, promoting chaos. The issues of over-saturated volunteer 
efforts as well as other forms of convergence are topics we looked to investigate through 
interviews with emergency experts, local authorities, and local stakeholders. These issues are 
prominent and important in emergency response as the responsible organizations often become 
overwhelmed. Through this project we have developed a set of recommendations for the CPU 
that will help address the issues of convergence facing Hounslow.  
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Chapter III: Methods 
 The project goal was to improve community engagement and management of voluntary 
contributions before, during, and after an emergency in Hounslow. We defined three 
intermediate objectives, listed below, that build toward this goal and we completed tasks within 
these objectives according to the timeline in Appendix B. 
● Objective 1: Identify best practices in volunteer management and community engagement 
● Objective 2: Evaluate how local authorities in Hounslow and other government agencies 
in and around London currently engage with the community, businesses, volunteers, and 
faith groups in the event of emergencies 
● Objective 3: Assess the needs and capabilities of local stakeholders in handling 
volunteers, materials, and other donations during emergencies. 
3.1 Objective 1: Identify best practices in volunteer 
management and community engagement 
 Identifying best practices in volunteer management and community engagement 
informed our final recommendations. We built on the best practices presented in the background 
section by conducting interviews with experts in the field of disaster response. 
In order to identify experts to interview, we sifted through citations in the literature and 
asked our interviewees to refer us to additional relevant experts. Since the experts identified were 
scattered across the globe, we interviewed the majority of them by Skype, and one in person. We 
used the script in Appendix C to interview experts. We asked open-ended questions specific to 
the interviewee’s expertise. 
Since the interviewees were experts in a variety of fields, primarily emergency 
management, we received a variety of suggestions about volunteer management and community 
engagement. To begin each interview, we inquired about interviewee’s previous research, 
naming an article or paper they wrote that we had read if possible. We also asked interviewees 
about handling convergence, especially convergence of material donations. Finally, we asked 
interviewees about the best mechanisms to improve coordination and cooperation between a 
variety of government agencies and volunteer groups. The script changed over the course of our 
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interviews in order to focus on important topics identified in our initial interviews. A full list of 
the experts we interviewed can be found in Appendix F. 
3.2 Objective 2: Evaluate how local authorities in Hounslow 
and other government agencies in and around London 
currently engage with the community, businesses, 
volunteers, and faith groups in the event of emergencies 
 In order to recommend improvements to the Hounslow CPU, we first examined how the 
unit and related government agencies currently engage with the community before, during, and 
after emergencies. By examining other government agencies in and around Hounslow, we 
learned what others are doing well. By examining the CPU, we were able to compare its 
practices with those of the other government agencies and with best practices from background 
research. 
To begin, we reviewed internal documents detailing Hounslow’s emergency response 
protocols, such as the Major Emergency Plan. We used the written protocols to assess how the 
borough would engage with the community in the event of an emergency. In addition, we 
interviewed local officers including Tim Arnold, a member of the CPU staff, about how the 
borough would engage with the community in an emergency. For these interviews, we used the 
script in Appendix D. Between our examination of protocols and interviews with local officers, 
we gained a clear understanding of current community engagement in the borough. Specifically, 
we examined what groups the CPU engages with and how it does so, how the CPU manages 
spontaneous volunteers, and how the CPU communicates with the community and with other 
organizations. 
We also examined other government agencies in Hounslow. We interviewed other units 
within the local authority and emergency response services, such as the Metropolitan Police. Our 
interviews were designed to discover how volunteers and convergence are planned for and 
responded to as well as how government agencies engage with the community before an 
emergency. In these interviews, we covered the same topics as the Hounslow CPU interviews 
using the script in Appendix D. We identified additional important emergency planning and 
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response groups by referral from previous interviewees. A full list of our interviewees from 
government organizations can be found in Appendix G. 
         We followed similar protocols for all our interviews in Hounslow. First, we developed a 
semi-structured interview script in consultation with our sponsor and advisors. Then, we 
identified interview subjects according to our objectives and made contact with them by email 
and telephone. We conducted semi-structured interviews with a primary interviewer and a scribe 
present. The scribe was responsible for recording interviewee responses on paper and digitally 
with the help of a recording device. As much as possible, we conducted these interviews in-
person at a location convenient for the interviewee. At the start of each interview we recited the 
preamble from the interview scripts in the appendices, in which we describe the purpose of our 
interviews, explain the interviewee’s right not to answer questions and their right to review 
quotations, and we asked for their consent to quote and record them. 
After collecting notes from our interviews, we identified common responses to our 
scripted questions, and we collected additional notes on possible CPU improvement from 
pursuing unscripted interview paths. We used the most common responses as the basis for our 
conclusions, and we quoted important unscripted dialogue that reinforces those conclusions. 
3.3 Objective 3: Assess the needs and capabilities of local 
stakeholders in handling volunteers, materials, and other 
donations during emergencies  
We determined the needs and capabilities of the stakeholders in Hounslow in order to 
make recommendations to the Hounslow CPU on how to improve community engagement, 
communication, and the use of volunteers in emergencies. We wanted to see what the 
stakeholders in the area are willing to provide to the community in an emergency and what 
communication they require from the CPU. To do this we first identified who the primary 
stakeholders of concern to the Hounslow CPU are by consulting our sponsor and by reviewing 
the Community Partnerships Unit’s list of voluntary groups. We identified the types of groups 
that typically volunteer in events such as the Grenfell Tower Fire by reading reports of these 
events and matching them with equivalent groups in Hounslow. We identified three major 
categories of relevant non-government stakeholders in Hounslow: businesses, local community 
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and volunteer groups, and faith groups.  Among these major categories, we identified, through 
our sponsor, background research, and the Community Partnerships Unit’s list of voluntary 
groups, several major stakeholders for initial interviews. These stakeholders included the 
Hounslow Chamber of Commerce, Volunteering Hounslow, and Hounslow Friends of Faith. We 
used snowball sampling to find more interviewees. A full list of our interviewees toward this 
objective can be found in Appendix H. 
The local stakeholders in Hounslow are diverse and may offer a variety of forms of aid in 
a disaster. We examined what local businesses and other stakeholders, such as volunteer and 
faith groups in Hounslow, can contribute in the event of a disaster. We also examined how 
volunteer efforts and the coordination and management of volunteers, materials, and donations 
can be more closely integrated into Hounslow’s emergency planning and response. This is 
expected to help avoid some of the problems encountered in the Grenfell Tower Fire. We 
examined available voluntary contributions in Hounslow through interviews with local 
stakeholders. We interviewed business groups, such as the Hounslow Chamber of Commerce, 
volunteer groups, such as Volunteering Hounslow, and faith groups, such as Hounslow Friends 
of Faith. There are many more volunteer groups in Hounslow like EACH Counseling and 
Support which are listed on the London Borough of Hounslow website under “Online Directory 
of voluntary organizations”. We went through the online directory with our sponsor to prioritize 
which groups to interview as there are over 550 listings. 
For these interviews, we used the script in Appendix E and the same general interview 
approach described in Objective 2. Through these interviews, we were able to gain a sense of the 
needs and capabilities of local stakeholders. First, with the information from these interviews, we 
created a database containing what the community can supply for the London Borough of 
Hounslow to access in the event of an emergency. We were also able to develop a set of 
recommendations for the CPU to pursue based on our work. Through our interviews we 
determined who has worked with the CPU in the past and how they felt the collaboration went. 
We also enquired about how people felt about the use of volunteers and donations in 
emergencies, and if they had any suggestions based on their own emergency protocols. Finally, 
we wanted to know if the groups we interviewed had any services or assets they are willing to 
provide in emergencies. 
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3.4 Deliverables 
The main deliverables of this project are a database of local stakeholders that could assist 
the CPU in an emergency and a set of recommendations on how the CPU can continue to 
improve community engagement. The database lists voluntary and community groups in the area 
along with their contact information and the assets they could provide in an emergency. Our 
recommendations are aimed at improving engagement with voluntary groups, engagement with 
the community at-large, and management of spontaneous and emergent behaviour. 
The stakeholders listed in the database include businesses, faith groups, volunteer groups, 
and community groups that are willing to help in the event of an emergency. It outlines what 
assets these groups are willing to offer, including volunteers, shelter, food, and clothes and it is 
aimed at helping the authorities better understand what is available in terms of voluntary aid 
from the community. To ensure a wide variety of assets and a good breadth of samples, we 
prioritized interviewing groups from each category of stakeholder. Unfortunately, we simply did 
not have enough time to interview every stakeholder in Hounslow. By interviewing groups from 
each category, we sought to lay a solid groundwork for a database for the CPU to further flesh 
out and continue to update in the future. 
Along with the database, our team’s set of recommendations for the CPU is oriented 
towards helping the CPU build relationships with existing voluntary groups, handle the 
emergence of new groups, and improve community engagement generally. Through our 
recommendations for improving engagement with established groups, engagement with the 
community at-large, and management of spontaneous and emergent behaviour, the CPU can 
improve community engagement and community resilience in Hounslow.   
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Chapter IV: Findings 
4.1 Best practices in volunteer management and community 
engagement 
 We assessed the best practices in volunteer management and community engagement 
through interviews with established experts in the field of emergency management and response. 
Throughout this process, we found that many of our interviewees tended to be in agreement with 
the general good will and potential that volunteers may have in working to recover from an 
emergency. Many of our expert interviewees also shared similar conclusions on how to manage 
the convergence of materials, volunteers, and information with many emphasizing the need for 
communication and networking before a disaster. The major themes that our interviewees 
brought up are shown below in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Best practices in volunteer management and community engagement from 
expert interviews 
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4.1.1 Established Communication Networks 
 In our interviews with experts, a common theme was the need for organization before an 
emergency in order to effectively incorporate volunteers in an emergency response. In our 
interview with David McEntire, Dean of Public Health and Services at Utah Valley University 
and co-author of “Emergent phenomena and the sociology of disaster: lessons, trends and 
opportunities from the research literature,” he mentioned that one approach to emergency 
response is to discourage spontaneous and emergent volunteers because such untrained 
volunteers run the risk of becoming liabilities. However, he also noted that people will likely 
volunteer anyway and that when viewed from a sociological perspective, such volunteers are an 
important resource in disaster response. This need for organization and prior communication 
between local authorities is reflected in the recommendations our team presents in Table 4. 
Table 4: Recommendations - Committee and Networking 
Recommendations 
Committee The CPU should establish an emergency planning committee that includes 
community leaders 
Networking The CPU should make attempts to establish informal connections with 
community leaders 
During our interview with Professor McEntire, he said that in order to maximize 
collaboration, the authorities should communicate and network with the voluntary sector before 
an emergency. He said the authorities must run practice drills with the volunteer groups often in 
order to be able to produce an organized, efficient, and flexible response. He further mentioned 
that an effective way of establishing a strong relationship with the voluntary sector is to create a 
local emergency planning committee made up of representatives from the major voluntary 
organizations in the area (see Table 4). These organizations will know the needs of the 
community and bring in more people, allowing further engagement with the community. As the 
community involvement grows, the response plans and strategies it produces will become more 
detailed and effective.  
The need for extensive communication and networking before a disaster was also 
corroborated by Thomas Drabek, Professor Emeritus from the University of Denver and 
coauthor of “Emergent phenomena and the sociology of disaster: lessons, trends and 
opportunities from the research literature.” During our interview with Professor Drabek, he 
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emphasized the need to facilitate coordination between groups and the need to build social 
relationships and networks before a disaster as well as the importance of a decentralized structure 
when incorporating volunteers. With the theme of incorporating the public sector, Professor 
Drabek stated that, in the United States, a successful emergency manager has a good sense of 
what groups are present in the community and can predict what types of groups will participate 
in emergency response. Such an emergency manager promptly verifies the specifics of an event 
while it is taking place and doesn’t just stop with government aid but is also able to further the 
response using a network created with the volunteer sector before the emergency. Networking 
allows the emergency manager to include voluntary organizations in the response in a more 
coordinated fashion rather than spending resources to prevent spontaneous volunteers from 
participating. 
4.1.2 Improvised Response 
During our interview with Professor McEntire, he brought up two main types of 
responses: planned responses and improvised responses. Ideally, communication and networking 
before an emergency facilitates the planning of emergency response covering a wide variety of 
situations, allowing for an efficient, coordinated response regardless of the emergency. However, 
when a disaster strikes that surprises emergency planners, and for which no preconceived plan is 
available, an improvised response may be necessary. For an improvised response to be effective, 
however, the authorities responding to the situation must be familiar with the organizations 
present in the area and must have established communication channels with them, which 
highlights again the need for communication and networking between authorities and the 
voluntary and community sector before an emergency. Such a response may be described as an 
educated improvised response. To illustrate this point, Professor McEntire, Professor Drabek, 
and Ms. Claire Rubin, President of the emergency management consulting firm Claire B. Rubin 
& Associates, LLC, all gave the example of the mass evacuation of Manhattan on 9/11 
nicknamed ‘American Dunkirk’. Over half a million people were evacuated from of the island 
primarily by civilian watercraft. This response to the terrorist attack in 2001 is widely viewed as 
an incredibly successful improvised response, and Professor McEntire told us its success was due 
to the communication between the authorities and the volunteer and private sectors during the 
event itself. 
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4.1.3 Volunteer Training and Certification 
 Many of our interviewees agreed on the massive potential present in the spontaneous 
efforts of volunteers, there did however surface a small rift between answers concerning the way 
in which people should be allowed to volunteer. While a portion of those interviewed saw any 
help that arrived as better than no help at all, others pressed the need to require volunteers to be 
trained and certified before being allowed to participate in a response. This point of view is 
reflected in our recommendations mentioned in Table 5, including recommendations for the local 
authority to open emergency volunteer training to the public and to invite community and 
volunteer groups to participate in its training drills. 
Table 5: Recommendations - Individual Training and Scenario Training 
Recommendations 
Individual Training The CPU should train volunteers who are not council employees through 
its current training program for council volunteers 
Scenario Training The CPU should involve voluntary and community groups in its 
scenario training drills 
While it is difficult to incorporate the public sector in situations involving government 
secrets, there have been efforts made to train and accredit volunteers in emergency response, and 
we recommend the CPU adopts the training procedures in Table 5. One effort to train volunteers 
that Ms. Rubin pointed us to is the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) in the 
United States. CERT is sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
works to train volunteer citizens in various skills including search and rescue and CERT clears 
volunteers to respond in emergencies that would require a background check. CERT shows the 
possibility of government trained volunteers effectively aiding in emergency management, 
though again organization and training before an emergency are critical. 
 In our interview with David Alexander, Professor of Risk and Disaster Reduction at 
University College London, he introduced us to the Italian emergency response volunteer 
system, in which volunteers are trained by their voluntary organizations and registered with the 
government. The volunteer organizations in Italy have been around for hundreds of years and 
volunteering is a significant part of their culture, with these groups often holding community 
events to maintain a strong presence in the community. The Italians take immense pride in their 
21 
 
volunteer organizations. Once an emergency occurs, these well-organized volunteer 
organizations activate immediately. As soon as their firemen declare a disaster site to be safe, 
volunteers are everywhere. The voluntary sector in Italy largely handles emergency response 
themselves and they are effective and efficient. Volunteer groups and individual volunteers are 
also protected in emergency response. For example: there is a law in Italy which protects 
volunteers from being fired if they respond to an emergency during work. Besides that, there is a 
registration system implemented in Italy that is essential for organizing volunteers quickly. All 
citizens need to provide their address and other basic information to the government, as with any 
other identification system. The importance of this system is that it also identifies if people who 
live in the disaster area are elderly, disabled or otherwise vulnerable. If an emergency occurs, the 
system will allow the government to determine if there is anyone living in the area when the 
emergency has happened and who needs the most help evacuating. The government and the 
volunteer organizations then collaborate to rescue those who live in the area, especially those 
who are vulnerable. 
4.1.4 Handling Convergence 
 Convergence of information, materials, and volunteers can overwhelm authorities and 
cause chaos. In our interviews with experts, we found several methods for handling convergence 
of volunteers and donations that could be included in the CPU’s plans. These are summarized in 
Table 6. 
Table 6: Recommendations - Plan to Manage Donations, Direct Spontaneous Volunteers, and 
Plan for Emergent Groups 
Recommendations 
Plan to Manage 
Donations 
The CPU should plan to divide donation management between different 
people by donation type 
Direct Spontaneous 
Volunteers 
The CPU should plan to direct individual spontaneous volunteers to 
established voluntary organizations in an emergency 
Plan for Emergent 
Groups 
The CPU should plan on emergent groups forming and determine what 
type of groups will likely form early in an emergency 
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 In our interview with Professor Holguín-Veras, he referred us to literature he had 
published including the article “Material convergence: Important and understudied disaster 
phenomenon,” which we reference in the background section of this paper. In this article he and 
his coauthors outline a variety of policy suggestions for preventing and managing material 
convergence. While such recommendations for preventing convergence are considered in other 
sections, their proposals for managing material convergence largely corroborate Professor 
Drabek’s recommendations in that they involve assigning people to manage donated goods. In 
the article, Professor Holguín-Veras and his team propose that it is necessary to prescreen 
donated materials to prevent the needless handling and storage of unneeded materials and 
expedite the transport of other materials based on how critical they are to the affected area. To 
make such a system more efficient he and his team further propose that volunteer groups could 
be accredited to sift through donated materials themselves and thus be able to bypass inspection 
from authorities. 
 In our interview with Professor Alexander, when speaking to the nature of the volunteer 
response present in Italy, he mentioned that the convergence of spontaneous volunteers is not 
generally an issue, since much of the population is involved in community organizations that are 
in communication with the government. This indicates that established volunteer groups are 
generally efficient in the management of volunteers, perhaps more so than the local authority 
who may not have the same level of interaction with the community. Based on Professor 
Alexander’s information on convergence in Italy and based on the issues with convergence of 
individual spontaneous volunteers, we recommend the CPU directs spontaneous volunteers to 
established groups (see Table 6). In Australia, the EV Crew model was used to effectively 
organize thousands of volunteers in a similar way by directing them to established groups 
through Volunteering Queensland (McLennan, Molloy, and Handmer, 2016). 
 Professor Drabek emphasized that emergency managers should plan on emergent groups 
forming during and after an emergency because their formation is essentially guaranteed. Based 
on this and our background research, we recommend that the CPU plans for emergent groups 
(see Table 6). Claire Rubin told us that emergent groups could be predicted early in an 
emergency by identifying what will be needed based on the type of emergency and what is 
available in the area. For example, after the Boston Marathon incident, medical personnel were 
needed, and because there are many medical professionals in the Boston area, a number of them 
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volunteered to help after the emergency. Professor McEntire also told us that emergent groups 
could be predicted based on the demographics of the area and based on what needs are not being 
met after an emergency. Towards this he gave the example of service organizations, such as faith 
groups, likely having an impact on volunteering and added that, if no official responders are 
initially present, ordinary people will likely take on emergent roles to help others. This was seen 
in the Boston Marathon incident where many medical professionals were among the crowd and 
acted as first responders. 
4.1.5 Media Interaction 
Along with engaging with the community and volunteer sectors before an emergency, 
communication with the media is also important given the tremendous capabilities of news 
reporters and social media sites to relay information. Because the media’s representation of an 
emergency can have an impact on public support, the CPU should implement the 
recommendations mentioned in Table 7. 
Table 7: Recommendations - Media Planning and Social Media 
Recommendations 
Media Planning The CPU should make plans with important media correspondents in the 
area to establish a source of accurate information in an emergency 
Social Media The CPU should use social media to disseminate accurate emergency 
information and request voluntary assistance from the community 
 At the end of our interview with Professor Alexander he also spoke about how 
government officials should communicate with media, particularly social media. He stated that, 
according to initial studies, social media is more likely to be self-correcting. Most false 
information will be objected to and proved incorrect by people who know the truth of the 
situation. However, government agencies still need ensure they use social media effectively to 
prevent false information from spreading. The government needs to be transparent and honest 
both with the media and on social media sites. 
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4.2 Current practices for engagement with the community, 
businesses, volunteers, and faith groups 
 In order to identify the current practices conducted by the local authorities in Hounslow, 
our team interviewed members of our sponsor’s unit, the CPU, as well as members of other units 
and other government agencies that we identified with our sponsor. These interviews largely 
focused on the methods used by each group for community engagement and the value of each 
method as well as on the capabilities of the CPU in the immediate response to a disaster. 
4.2.1 Current Practices for Community Engagement in Other Government Groups 
We interviewed representatives of a number of government groups outside the Hounslow 
CPU, detailed in Appendix G. From these interviews we learned the current practices for 
community engagement, which include direct two-way communication through informal 
contacts, communication via committees and social media, and empowering the community 
through training. Based on current community engagement practices, we propose the 
recommendations referenced in Table 8. 
Table 8: Recommendations - Networking, Committee, Social Media, Train the Trainer, and 
Individual Training 
Recommendations 
Networking The CPU should make attempts to establish informal connections with 
community leaders 
Committee The CPU should establish an emergency planning committee that 
includes community leaders 
Social Media The CPU should use social media to disseminate accurate emergency 
information and request voluntary assistance from the community 
Train the Trainer The CPU should train community leaders to train volunteers in 
emergency response and recovery 
Individual Training The CPU should train volunteers who are not council employees through 
its current training program for council volunteers 
Two-way communication is important for community engagement because it allows the 
community to voice their concerns to emergency planners and it allows the government to advise 
the community about what to do in an emergency. Two-way communication can be 
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accomplished through direct, informal communication between individuals in different groups or 
through forums and meetings. For example, Community and Faith Officer Dave Turtle of the 
Metropolitan Police told us one way the police engage with faith groups is through informal 
connections between faith leaders and himself. Joan Conlon, head of the Prevent team in the 
Community Partnerships Unit, told us one way that her unit engages with the community is 
through meetings of the Hounslow Community Network, a network with 353 member 
organizations that holds meetings once a month. 
The government groups we interviewed used multiple communication channels to 
improve community engagement. In addition to informal connections, the police also rely on 
Twitter to inform the community, and they engage with the community through forums such as 
the Faith Leaders Forum. The Prevent Team avoids top-down communication techniques like 
informing the community and prefers to advise groups on a case-by-case basis. 
In addition to informing, advising, and engaging the community, government groups also 
empower the community by training and educating community members in skills relevant to the 
government group. For example, the police train citizens for the Community Speedwatch 
scheme, while the Prevent team trains people to develop critical thinking skills and to recognize 
propaganda. Joan Conlon recommended the ‘train the trainer’ model used by the Prevent team 
for training people in the community. In this model, shown in Figure 6, a regulating 
organization, such as the borough government, schedules training sessions for community 
leaders in which those leaders are taught how to train others in useful skills such as those used in 
emergency response. 
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Another form of training is simply opening up individual training to the public. Providing 
training to people who are not involved with a volunteer group is another way for people to 
access education about emergency response. In Figure 7 the numbers represent the general 
effectiveness of a volunteer: 1 being not effective, 2 being somewhat effective and 3 being very 
effective. Training can educate the community, and if the community is well educated, the 
general effectiveness of available volunteers will improve, thus improving emergency response 
as a whole. 
Government 
Leader Leader Leader 
Empowered Community Members 
Figure 7: Train the Trainer Model 
Figure 6: Volunteer effectiveness chart from speaking with 
Twm Palmer 
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One deliverable of this project is a database of voluntary groups in the area that could 
provide resources in an emergency. The police do not maintain a database of voluntary groups, 
preferring informal connections, but the Community Partnerships Unit does maintain a database 
of 648 active voluntary groups in Hounslow. The Community Partnerships Unit’s database 
records contact information for each group along with a short description of each group.  
4.2.2 Evaluation of Community Engagement at the Hounslow CPU 
 We interviewed Tim Arnold, Contingency Planning Officer of the Hounslow CPU, to 
review the CPU’s current practices for community engagement. The CPU has a mutual aid 
agreement with the Red Cross but does not otherwise interact with voluntary organizations in the 
borough; that being said, it does have contact with various voluntary organizations through the 
Community Partnerships Unit. Compared to the Metropolitan Police, the CPU has fewer and less 
direct connections with the community. The CPU periodically sends out mass emails and 
pamphlets to the citizens of the borough that detail what to do in an emergency but such methods 
are not as effective as the two-way communication channels used by the Metropolitan Police. 
This is because the channels utilized by the Police allow the community to inform authorities 
about potential threats, so members of the community can not only receive information, but are 
also able to send information to the Police. This aligns with Professor Drabek’s comment that 
emergency managers need a group of community leaders who can identify and discuss the 
vulnerabilities of the community. 
 In addition to interviewing members of the local government, we also visited the 
emergency storage area of the CPU. There we observed provisions of clothes, sleeping bags, and 
other miscellaneous supplies for initial emergency response per the Minimum Standards for 
London. Our revision of the internal documents from the CPU revealed that the Borough of 
Hounslow has bedding for 200 people and clothing for approximately 100 people as well as 
spaces spread throughout the borough for shelter that are able to accomodate victims for the first 
72 hours after an emergency. There are 11 ‘Fusion’ centers which have an average capacity of 
256 people and 8 ‘HRA’ centers which have an average capacity of 60 people, with all of these 
facilities being owned by the Borough Council and available as shelter once an emergency 
occurs. We did notice, however, problems associated with perishable goods. The CPU has stored 
food and other supplies, but not only do these need to be constantly kept up to date, but the 
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supply of food the CPU keeps in their emergency storage is minimal. This supply is only meant 
to provide for the first 72 hours of an emergency response as the CPU assumes that they can 
acquire supplies from the community afterwards. Given the capabilities of the CPU however, we 
found that the area of transportation in particular appeared to be lacking. The CPU does have 
access to the borough authority’s vehicles, however this supply is undependable as these vehicles 
are shared between other groups and are not guaranteed to always be available. 
4.3 Needs and capabilities of local stakeholders in handling 
volunteers, materials, and other donations during 
emergencies 
 In order to assess the abilities of the community in providing aid to emergency response 
and to learn what these groups expect from the local authority of Hounslow in return, our team 
identified key groups in the borough that may prove to be among the most valuable for 
producing such aid and interviewed representatives from each group. Our interviews with these 
groups were very insightful in terms of discovering what they want from the CPU concerning 
leadership and guidance as well as what assets they may be willing to offer and under what 
circumstances. The desires held by these groups were kept in mind while formulating our 
recommendations for the CPU and their responses as to what they may be willing to offer in the 
event of an emergency were stored in a database presented to our sponsor at the end of our 
project. 
4.3.1 Needs of Stakeholders 
Through our interviews, we found that many of the groups in Hounslow want certain 
commitments from the CPU in order to be included in a response effort. One of the most 
important of which is, the need for the CPU to build and maintain personal relationships with 
these groups, with such interactions largely based on two-way communication. Along with this 
informal communication, the groups of the borough are looking for direction from the CPU in 
matters involving emergency planning and response. Based on the needs of these groups as well 
as other stakeholders, we recommend the CPU establishes relationships with community leaders 
and includes community groups in scenario training (Table 9). 
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Table 9: Recommendations - Networking and Scenario Training 
Recommendations 
Networking The CPU should make attempts to establish informal connections with 
community leaders 
Scenario Training The CPU should involve voluntary and community groups in its 
scenario training drills 
 In accord with the desires of faith groups, many businesses in the area are also happy to 
provide aid. In our interview with Stephen Fry, of the Hounslow Chamber of Commerce, he 
talked of the businesses represented by the Chamber of Commerce and his ability to facilitate 
communication between them and the local authorities, with whom he said he had a good 
relationship with, though he is not familiar with the CPU specifically. He also mentioned that 
social media platforms such as Twitter and LinkedIn in communication as well as phone calls 
have proved to be effective contact methods. During this interview it was noted that as with the 
faith groups, the Chamber would be looking to the local authority for leadership in emergency 
planning and response, though the Chamber would like to be involved. 
For secular voluntary groups, we interviewed Robert Johnson and Bridgitte Fauxbert of 
the Hounslow Rotary club. In this interview, they did not highlight many needs from the CPU, 
however they did mention that it would be valuable for the CPU to work on their publicity. In 
fact, before our interview with them both Robert and Bridgitte were unaware that the CPU 
existed. They mentioned that if the CPU were to increase community awareness of themselves, it 
could be valuable simply because more members of the community would know about the CPU. 
Using what was learned from these interviews with stakeholders, the project team 
identified the needs of the local stakeholders within Hounslow and summarized them in Table 
10, shown below. These needs were also taken into account when formulating the 
recommendations shown in Table 9. 
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Table 10: Needs of local stakeholders 
Needs 
Guidance The vast majority of community groups are willing to help and 
participate during emergencies, they simply need guidance from the 
CPU on how to go about doing so. 
Two-Way 
Communication  
Most community groups want the CPU to develop a relationship and 
maintain a dialogue with them. 
Scenario Training  For the community groups that wish to be part of emergency response, 
most of them indicated that they wish to partake in scenario training to 
better prepare themselves for real emergencies.  
4.3.2 Capabilities of Stakeholders 
The various stakeholder groups in Hounslow are more than willing to assist if an 
emergency occurs. They can provide all the resources the CPU is looking for: space, volunteers, 
food, and vehicles. Each group has different resources to offer, however, so we recommend the 
CPU records the different resources of community stakeholders in a database described in 
Appendix I. 
We interviewed Reverend Richard Frank, the vicar of All Souls Church and Area Dean. 
All Souls is a Church of England parish in the Kensington Episcopal Area of the Diocese of 
London. The CPU has not cooperated with the church before, but the church is willing to work 
with the government to offer help when an emergency occurs. 
 One of the strengths of All Souls Church is that they have a strong contingency network 
within the Church of England. They have conducted emergency training and exercises and they 
have a good relationship with the local community. However, they are not emergency response 
professionals. The vicar wants to have more information on how to respond and direct people in 
an emergency and he is looking forward to being involved in the Hounslow Resilience Forum. 
All Souls Church is able to provide both transportation and food, which were identified 
previously as items the CPU could use in an emergency. Churches have food banks, and they 
may be able to assist in managing spontaneous material donations. Large churches can provide 
vehicles as well. People are welcome to come to the churches for help. According to the vicar, 
after an emergency they will "open the church doors, turn on the lights, and play light music no 
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matter the time of day." Many of the clergy are able to provide emotional support to those 
affected by an emergency. All Souls Church can provide a place for people to gather and take 
care of each other after an emergency. 
Because of the strong network within the Church of England, Reverend Frank told us that 
the CPU only needs to call him to get help from all available volunteers from Anglican churches 
in the area. Calling the churches for assistance could relieve pressure from the CPU when an 
emergency occurs. Within the parish, churches typically have space and volunteers. Churches 
have good relationships with various other groups and companies in the borough. For example, 
All Souls Church worked with Tesco in the past to provide food to the homeless, and Tesco has 
expressed willingness to cooperate in the future.  
 The Gurdwara Sri Guru Singh Sabha also was very capable and willing to help in 
emergency situations; however, what they may be able to provide varies depending on who in 
their community decides to volunteer. The Gurdwara is definitely capable of providing one of 
the four main supplies needed by the CPU: food. They also are likely to provide volunteers and 
space. They mentioned that they possess the capability to collect monetary donations, house the 
homeless, disseminate information and coordinate volunteers.  
 Similar to the Anglican churches of the area, the Hounslow Chamber of Commerce is 
very well networked with a database of around 18,000 businesses in the borough with whom the 
Chamber has regular contact. While the database cannot be shared with the local authority for 
legal reasons, Stephen Fry of the Chamber expressed a willingness to facilitate communication 
between the groups it represents and the CPU and would like to be included in emergency 
planning. Stephen Fry also expressed a desire to improve their already positive relations with the 
local authorities. He mentioned that the chamber of commerce has not had any previous contact 
with the CPU but is very willing to build that relationship. Mr. Fry is also willing to participate 
in the proposed local emergency planning committee. He would be an important addition to the 
committee due to his many contacts and relationships with businesses in the borough. With so 
many businesses engaged through the Chamber of Commerce, once the relationship is fully 
formed, the assets available to the CPU will increase significantly. Stephen Fry indicated that 
setting this up will take planning so it will be necessary for the CPU to meet with the Hounslow 
Chamber of Commerce directly. 
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 In our interview with Michael Green of Groundwork London, he mentioned that 
Volunteering Hounslow, which is affiliated with Groundwork London, is capable of providing 
volunteers during emergencies. When we interviewed Aine Hayes of the Community 
Partnerships Unit she told us the unit commissions Volunteering Hounslow to produce trained 
volunteers whenever they are needed. She also told us that the majority of volunteer groups 
within Hounslow are relatively small, with many of them not having their own offices and only 
consisting of part-time volunteer members, with this she added that it is important to 
communicate with the community to determine what the volunteer sector can provide and what 
support they require from the authorities. It was then further noted that along with Volunteering 
Hounslow, the borough does help fund, through the Community Partnerships Unit, groups 
wishing to hold community events and also sends out newsletters to the volunteer sector on a 
regular basis. 
In our interview with The Hounslow Rotary Club, Robert and Bridgitte mentioned a few 
things that could be of value to the CPU. First, they stated that they would be willing to be part 
of a local emergency planning committee. The two also mentioned that they would be able to 
facilitate communication and spread information within their rotary club network which has a 
total of five clubs in the Borough of Hounslow. Finally, Robert and Bridgitte mentioned that The 
Hounslow Rotary Club and possibly other rotary clubs in the area would be able to organize and 
lead emergent volunteers. 
The capabilities of groups within the borough willing to provide aid that were 
encountered during the time of this project are outlined in Table 11, shown below. The 
capabilities of these groups illustrate their potential importance in emergency response and that 
incorporating them into emergency response would prove to be valuable. 
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Table 11: Capabilities of local stakeholders 
Capabilities 
Volunteers Most community groups are able to provide trained and organized 
volunteers. 
Space  Some community groups are able to provide space and shelter for 
displaced people and storage of goods. 
Donations Different community groups are able to provide different goods. From 
monetary donations to food, these groups are willing to donate what they 
can in emergency situations. 
It should be noted that all of the potential contributions of the stakeholders are voluntary 
and they should not be assumed to be available at all times. Many groups were very willing to 
help and expressed a desire to be a part of emergency response, however situations vary and 
nothing can be guaranteed. 
4.3.3 Structure and Purpose of the Database 
Using the information gathered, our team compiled a database of the structure detailed in 
Appendix I to catalog the organizations throughout Hounslow that are interested in providing 
voluntary aid in the case of an emergency. The database contains information regarding 
organizations’ approximate size, contact information for their representatives, and what assets 
they would be willing to offer in an emergency. The database is designed to facilitate 
communication between the CPU and the organizations listed in the database, and it is designed 
to aid coordination of voluntary contributions. Our recommendations for building and 
maintaining the database are outlined in Table 12. 
Table 12: Recommendations - Fill Out Database and Update Database 
Recommendations 
Fill Out Database The CPU should fill out the database with information on key 
community and voluntary groups 
Update Database The CPU should regularly update the database to ensure all the 
information is recent and valid 
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The database is intended for members of the CPU to reference in order to organize the 
contact information of organizations it has previously contacted, but the database is not meant to 
replace communication or to be used only when a disaster occurs. As shown previously, regular 
two-way communication is critical to maintaining positive relationships with voluntary groups. 
Therefore, we recommend the CPU designate a member of its team to build and maintain 
relationships with the representatives of each group detailed in the database. This member should 
be in regular contact with each representative in order to ensure effective communication 
between the CPU and organizations in the case of an emergency. 
Since direct, personal communication is important in creating positive connections with 
members of the community, the database currently only lists groups that the project team spoke 
with directly. Because the database does not currently contain a comprehensive list of the 
approximately 650 voluntary organizations in Hounslow, the Contingency Planning Unit can add 
other groups to the database over time. Not all voluntary groups in Hounslow will be willing to 
contribute in an emergency, however, and because direct communication is important, the 
Contingency Planning Unit should only add organizations to the database that the unit has 
spoken to directly about providing resources in an emergency. In order to speak with more 
representatives of organizations and add those organizations to the database, the CPU should 
endeavor to network with the community.  
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Chapter V: Recommendations 
 Improving engagement with established voluntary groups in Hounslow will help reduce 
chaos in the aftermath of a disaster and improve community resilience. By improving 
relationships and building rapport with established groups, a coordinated response to an 
emergency is more likely. Additionally, this project’s findings from experts and from 
government officers in Hounslow suggest that engagement with the community at-large through 
media and forums will help the CPU stay informed about potential hazards in Hounslow. Finally, 
this project investigated how to manage spontaneous and emergent behavior. Our 
recommendations on these three topics are shown in Figure 8 and Table 13.  
Figure 8: Recommendations 
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Table 13: Complete list of recommendations 
Recommendations 
1. Scenario Training The CPU should involve voluntary and community groups in its 
scenario training drills 
2. Fill Out Database The CPU should fill out the database with information on key 
community and voluntary groups 
3. Update Database The CPU should regularly update the database to ensure all the 
information is recent and valid 
4. Form a Committee The CPU should establish an emergency planning committee that 
includes community leaders 
5. Social Media The CPU should use social media to disseminate accurate emergency 
information and request voluntary assistance from the community 
6. Media Planning The CPU should make plans with important media correspondents in 
the area to establish a source of accurate information in an emergency 
7. Direct Spontaneous 
Volunteers 
The CPU should plan to direct individual spontaneous volunteers to 
established voluntary organizations in an emergency 
8. Plan to Manage 
Donations 
The CPU should plan to divide donation management between 
different people by donation type 
9. Plan for Emergent 
Groups 
The CPU should plan on emergent groups forming and determine 
what type of groups will likely form early in an emergency 
10. Individual 
Training 
The CPU should train volunteers who are not council employees 
through its current training program for council volunteers 
11. Train the Trainer The CPU should train community leaders to train volunteers in 
emergency response and recovery 
12. Networking The CPU should make attempts to establish informal connections with 
community leaders 
5.1 Involve volunteer groups in scenario training 
The CPU already conducts scenario training for its shelter plan with borough volunteers 
and associated staff approximately once every three years. The CPU should invite volunteer 
groups to participate in the existing training to improve efficiency and intercommunication. 
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5.2 Fill out the database 
For this project, the authors created a database that contains information about resources 
specific to each community group. The authors contacted key groups and made 6 entries into the 
database. The CPU should continue to reach out to as many groups and businesses as possible in 
order to create a comprehensive database. The CPU should try to contact and build relationships 
with a variety of groups that are capable of offering different assets. We have developed a short 
list of groups for the CPU to contact in the near future and delivered it to our sponsor.  
5.3 Periodically update the database to ensure information is 
accurate 
Once the database is filled out with a variety of groups, the CPU should update each 
entry every 6 months to ensure that the entries are accurate. Updating the database should be the 
responsibility of one individual in the CPU. 
5.4 Form a local emergency planning committee 
The CPU should form a local emergency planning committee. The committee will meet 
about planning and organizing disaster response. This committee would initially include 
representatives of major voluntary, community, and faith groups in the area such as Hounslow 
Friends of Faith as well as emergency services, such as the Police Department. As the committee 
meets, members will identify what community groups are not represented in the committee. 
Committee members will then invite new people to join to address what the committee lacks. As 
the committee grows, the planning will become more complete. Such a committee could be 
formed as a subcommittee of the Hounslow Resilience Forum, which addresses emergency 
planning, or as a subcommittee of the Hounslow Community Network, which helps the borough 
engage with community groups. 
5.5 Form a social media group/page 
The CPU should create a social media group. The social media group can act as a group 
chat for an emergency planning committee and as a page for accurate information distribution. 
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The CPU should also actively try to get valuable members of the community to follow their 
page, particularly the Police who have 1.2 million Twitter followers, in order to increase the 
number of people who will receive the distributed information. 
5.6 Plan with the media 
The CPU should plan with the media before emergencies occur. The plan should consist 
of where the media can get information from the CPU, how often they will be addressed and by 
whom they will be addressed. When briefing the media during an emergency, the CPU should 
make sure to communicate what types of donations are needed and the number of volunteers that 
are needed and the CPU should encourage monetary donations. When addressing the media, the 
CPU should share all available information so that the information the media broadcasts is as 
accurate as possible and so that trust is maintained. The CPU should make a particular effort not 
to hide information from the public. The CPU should assign one of their members to the role of 
interacting with the media. This person should be skilled in communicating, and should keep in 
regular contact with media sources during non-emergency situations. 
5.7 Direct spontaneous volunteers 
The CPU should develop an emergency response plan for how they wish to deal with 
spontaneous volunteers. This plan should put volunteer groups in charge of directing 
spontaneous volunteers. Advise spontaneous volunteers to talk to volunteer organizations and 
make willing volunteer organizations responsible for addressing spontaneous volunteers. 
Additionally, in the case of a hazardous disaster area, the CPU and other emergency services 
should make sure the disaster area is safe before allowing uncertified spontaneous volunteers in. 
The CPU should never prevent a volunteer from assisting unless the disaster site is unsafe, 
instead the CPU should refer untrained spontaneous volunteers to an established volunteer 
organization. This plan can be communicated through the committee and can be practiced in 
scenario training. 
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5.8 Plan for screening and management of donations 
The CPU should develop a screening plan for dealing with unneeded supplies. If these 
supplies are not dealt with, they are not only useless but they will get in the way. Part of this plan 
should be to communicate with the media to discourage people from sending unneeded supplies 
in the first place. The CPU should develop a plan for managing food as it is one of the most 
common donations. Part of this plan should detail how the CPU will check for and dispose of 
spoiled food. For the remaining donations that have been deemed safe, the CPU should develop a 
plan for proper distribution of these goods. Availability and preparation of vehicles will be 
important for this plan. 
5.9 Plan for emergent groups 
When an emergency occurs, the CPU should determine the likely groups that may 
emerge based on the unmet needs specific to the emergency. Emergent groups should be 
contacted and certified by the CPU as soon as possible. 
5.10 Open up individual volunteer training to the public 
The CPU should open up individual training that is currently available to council 
volunteers to members of the community. The training should be well advertised, accessible, and 
the frequency should be based on demand. The CPU should consider implementing a 
certification system for trained volunteers. When a volunteer is certified, the CPU should record 
any special skills a volunteer may possess such as CPR certification as well as the volunteer’s 
contact information, and the CPU should offer the certified volunteer enhanced access to areas 
they wish to assist at. 
5.11 Train the trainer 
The CPU should use the train the trainer model to empower volunteers through volunteer 
and community groups. The CPU should train the leaders of these groups who can then train the 
members of their organization for emergency response and recovery volunteering. If training 
sessions for community leaders have a low turnout, it is best to contact organizations and plan to 
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go to their locations. This will ensure the organization does not forget or avoid attending the 
training session. The CPU should consider a certification system here similar to the one 
described in recommendation 10. 
5.12 Networking 
The CPU should constantly be networking with groups and community leaders in the 
borough as well as outside of the borough. Anyone the CPU encounters that may be able to 
provide an asset in an emergency should be engaged with and potentially added to the database. 
The CPU should develop informal relationships with community leaders. Specifically, direct 
relationships between a member of the CPU and members of voluntary and community 
organizations. The CPU should consider holding community events periodically to improve the 
CPU’s relationship with the community, increase the number of informal connections the CPU 
has in the community, and build social capital. The CPU should develop a plan to increase their 
publicity and the public’s knowledge of what they do as many people are unaware of their 
existence. A social media page could benefit from this publicity and could also be an avenue to 
increase public knowledge of the CPU. 
5.13 Conclusion 
Managing convergence is an essential component of emergency management, with 
effective donation and volunteer management critical to maximizing the efficiency of an 
emergency response. The scope of this project entailed working with the Hounslow Contingency 
Planning Unit to determine what the unit could do to improve community engagement before, 
during, and after an emergency in order to facilitate donation and volunteer management. 
To begin, the project team conducted interviews with established experts in disaster 
research to determine the best practices in volunteer management and community engagement. 
This was followed by interviews with government officials to understand the current practices in 
Hounslow. Afterwards prominent community, volunteer, faith, and business groups operating 
within Hounslow were identified and interviewed to assess their capabilities to help in a disaster 
response if they were interested in doing so and to learn what they were looking for from the 
local authority regarding leadership, training, and communication. Through this project it was 
41 
 
revealed that many of the groups present within the borough are more than willing to provide aid 
and are looking to the local authority for leadership, guidance, and training. These interviews 
also provided insight regarding the best practices for volunteer management and community 
engagement, which ultimately manifested in the produced set of recommendations. 
The findings of this project outline the importance of networking between local 
authorities and community groups before, during, and after an emergency and are based on 
themes encountered from a variety of sources. Beginning with case studies in the literature 
review and expert interviews, to the current practices by the local authorities in Hounslow, and 
finishing with the reported needs of the stakeholders of the borough themselves, the research 
detailed in this report presents the need for communication again and again. These 
recommendations are specific to Hounslow but are built on principles for best practice. The 
findings presented in this report, based on best practices, that volunteer training and direct, two-
way communication with community leader are important, can therefore be applied to 
emergency planning outside of Hounslow.  
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Appendix A: The Borough of Hounslow and the 
Contingency Planning Unit 
The London Borough of Hounslow is in West London and borders the Thames River 
(See Figure 9). The London Government Act of 1963 created Hounslow from three smaller local 
authorities: Brentford and Chiswick, Heston and Isleworth, and Feltham. Although Hounslow is 
one of the outer boroughs of London, the number of businesses keeps growing. From 2009 to 
2014, the number of enterprises in Hounslow increased 20%. In the same period, Hounslow also 
had the highest growth of micro-businesses in West London boroughs.  The borough covers an 
area of 55.98 km2 and has a population of 271,100 people (Standard Area Measurements, 2017; 
Population Estimates). Hounslow is a diverse community: 53.3% of the borough's population is 
White, 34.4% is Asian, and 11.6% is Black.  
Figure 9: Location of Hounslow within Greater London (London Boroughs (December 2015) 
Map, 2016; edited) 
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The Hounslow Borough Council is the governing body of the London Borough of 
Hounslow and it is made up of 49 councillors from the Labour party and 11 councillors from the 
Conservative party (About The Council, 2017). The people of Hounslow elect councillors for 
four year terms from each of Hounslow’s 20 wards. The role of the Council is to be a community 
leader as well as a provider of services (About The Council, 2017). The councillors determine the 
direction Council policy should take but do not directly manage services (Role of a Councillor, 
2018). That task falls to Council officers, employees of the Council who handle the day-to-day 
duties of the Council (Constitution, 2015). 
Local business rates, fees and rents, a 
tax on borough residents, and grants from 
central government fund the council and its 
officers (See Figure 10). The council divides 
its spending on services into three 
departments: Chief Executive and Corporate 
Resources, Children’s and Adults’ Services, 
and Regeneration, Economic Development 
and Environment (REDE). In the 2018-19 
budget, the council divided £637.1m as 
follows: £221.6m to Chief Executive 
Resources, £323.7m to Children’s and Adults’ Services, and £91.9m to REDE (Council Tax 
Leaflet 18-19, 2018). Community safety expenditures, such as funds for the emergency planning 
unit, come out of the £91.9m REDE budget (Council Tax Leaflet 18-19, 2018). 
Hounslow is susceptible to many types of emergencies, most of which also threaten the 
whole city of London. Of these emergencies, London is particularly vulnerable to flooding and 
fires. To help mitigate damage from emergencies across the UK, the British Parliament passed 
the Civil Contingencies Act(CCA) in 2004. The CCA requires central, regional, and local 
government agencies to prepare for potential emergencies. This act led to the creation of 
contingency planning units including the Hounslow Contingency Planning Unit (CPU). The 
unit’s duties under the act include assessing the likelihood of potential emergencies and 
maintaining plans to prevent, reduce, control, or mitigate those emergencies (Civil Contingencies 
Act, 2004). 
Figure 10: Budget of the London Borough of 
Hounslow (Council Tax Leaflet 18-19, 2018) 
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The CPU provides works with public and private entities including volunteers and charity 
organizations to provide aid to the people of Hounslow (Emergencies, 2018). The CPU uses the 
Hounslow Resilience Forum to facilitate communication and planning with other CCA 
responders as well as partner organizations and businesses. The core members of the forum 
include the CPU, police, fire brigade, National Health Service, and British Red Cross among 
others. The forum meets quarterly to provide updates on plans and incidents and participate in 
training and exercises (London Borough of Hounslow Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). The 
Hounslow Resilience Forum interacts with the London and regional forums to facilitate 
communication in the case of large-scale emergencies (See Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Resilience Forum Structure (London Borough of Hounslow Contingency Planning 
Unit, 2015) 
 One of the responsibilities of the CPU is coordinating the efforts of emergency services, 
local authorities, and volunteers in case of a situation that poses a great threat to the borough in 
order to maximize the efficiency of the available help (Hounslow Friends of Faith, 2014). The 
Grenfell Tower fire in the borough of Kensington and Chelsea was one such emergency that 
tested the abilities of the CPU. In June of 2017, the Grenfell Tower fire claimed 71 lives and left 
many more homeless and physically or mentally scarred (The Hindu, 2017). More than half a 
year since the fire, the CPU is still working to provide support and guidance to the victims of the 
fire and attempting to find housing and medical care for those who need it. 
Initially reported in North Kensington at 12:54 AM the Grenfell Tower fire was not under 
control until over twenty-four hours later, at 1:14 AM the next day, after over 240 firefighters 
responded to the fire and rescued 65 people (BBC, 2017). However, multiple equipment failures 
involving low water pressure and radio issues as well as the absence of certain equipment 
hindered the rescue process, leading to criticisms of inadequacies on the part of the government 
(BBC, 2017). In the days after the fire, councillors from other boroughs commented that while 
emergency responders, volunteers, and the local community responded well, there was no 
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planning or strategic presence from the Kensington and Chelsea Council (KCC) (MacAskill, 
2017). The KCC was also criticized for failing to communicate with survivors and with people 
who wanted to help (Baynes; MacAskill, 2017). 
After Prime Minister Theresa May declared that the KCC’s response to the Grenfell 
Tower fire had not been adequate, the government drafted a special task force to take over the 
response from the KCC (Baynes, 2017). This task force included emergency management staff 
from other boroughs, NHS workers, and British Red Cross volunteers as well as emergency 
responders (Baynes, 2017). Tragedies such as the Grenfell Tower fire highlight the need for 
effective emergency planning, cooperation between authorities, and communication with the 
community and with volunteers. In light of the fire, the Hounslow CPU would like our team to 
explore how to improve the way they engage with the community before, during, and after an 
emergency. 
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Appendix B: Timeline of Project Tasks 
 
Figure 12: Timeline of Project Tasks 
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Appendix C: Expert Interview Script 
Preamble 
Hello, I am (name). I am part of a team of Worcester Polytechnic Institute students exploring 
how to improve community engagement in Hounslow, London before, during, and after an 
emergency. We are interviewing academic experts in the field of emergency planning globally 
and would like to interview you to gather information about best practices for community and 
volunteer engagement in emergency planning. This interview is voluntary and you may refuse to 
answer any questions you wish and stop the interview at any time. Can we take notes and record 
this interview? Do you mind if we quote any portion of this interview in our report? If you 
prefer, we can keep your identity confidential. We will send you any quotes for review before 
finalizing them in our report. 
 
Interview: 
1. [Name the research when asking this question if possible] Can you tell us a bit about any 
research you have done related to [List only relevant topics:] community engagement, 
community resilience, volunteer management, or donation management? 
2. What can established volunteer groups and emergency response agencies do before an 
emergency to improve the use of volunteers and donations during an emergency? 
3. What mechanisms would you recommend for improving coordination and cooperation 
between established volunteer groups and emergency response agencies? 
a. Why those mechanisms? 
b. What mechanisms can improve coordination between established groups and 
emergency response agencies with emergent volunteer groups? Why? 
c. What mechanisms can be used for spontaneous volunteers? Why? 
4. Is it possible to anticipate what sort of emergent volunteer groups might form during an 
emergency? 
a. Could this be used to improve cooperation with the anticipated emergent groups 
or to make plans involving those groups? 
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b. How reliable are such predictions and what drawbacks may exist when they are 
incorrect? / Have predictions been made and used in emergency response before 
and if so, how effective were they? 
5. How can volunteer groups and emergency services better handle problems associated 
with the convergence of volunteers following a disaster? 
a. how can they be organized so their skills can be used? 
b. how to keep volunteers from getting in the way or becoming a liability 
6. Planned response vs. educated improvised response (evacuation of Manhattan during 
9/11). 
What kind of principles underlie why each approach may be more effective than the other 
in a given disaster? What case studies show this? 
7. Many of the suggestions for the previous topics and questions may be specific to a given 
situation. What principles or guidelines can be drawn from them to provide a broader, 
more applicable policy or framework for convergence and volunteer management in 
emergency response? 
8. (*If relevant) Informational convergence also plays a role in the chaos that follows the 
start of a disaster and largely has to do with media coverage of the event. Such media 
coverage could be a powerful tool in communicating information, but unfortunately also 
has the potential to inaccurately represent the affected communities and what they need, 
resulting in personnel and material convergence. 
a. How often is this a substantial problem? 
b. How may the authorities and response groups interact with the media to 
communicate an accurate message about the situation and what is needed to avoid 
convergence? 
9. Do you know of any specific emergencies / case studies where community engagement 
or resilience were particularly well or poorly handled? 
10. Can you recommend any documents or research about managing volunteers and 
community engagement before, during, and after an emergency? 
11. Is there anyone you would recommend we contact to find out more about managing 
volunteers? 
12. Do you mind if we contact you again in the future?  
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Appendix D: Government Organization Interview 
Script 
Preamble 
Hello, I am (name). I am part of a team of Worcester Polytechnic Institute students exploring 
how to improve community engagement in Hounslow before, during, and after an emergency. 
We would like to interview you to see how your organization uses community engagement in 
relation to emergencies and how your organization interacts with volunteers. This interview is 
voluntary and you may refuse to answer any questions you wish and stop the interview at any 
time. Can we take notes and record this interview? Do you mind if we quote any portion of this 
interview in our report? If you prefer, we can keep your identity confidential. We will send you 
any quotes for review before finalizing them in our report. 
 
Role: 
1. What is your organization’s role/Does your organization have a role in emergency 
planning? 
a. If none: How do you coordinate with emergency planning authorities? 
2. What is your organization’s role/Does your organization have a role in community 
engagement? 
Community Resilience: 
1. One step for improving community resilience, from online cabinet office guidance, is 
informing, engaging, and empowering the community. What has your organisation done 
in each of these categories? 
 For reference: 
 Informing - dissemination of information about emergencies and emergency plans 
Engaging - two-way communication with the community and communication networks 
with community organizations or leaders 
Empowering - ensuring the community is able to access all available resources + 
improving coordination between holders of resources within community 
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2. What else has your organisation done to improve community resilience? 
3. For emergency planning agencies: Are any of your responder resilience structures open to 
the public? (information in the public domain, simple volunteer facing schemes, two-way 
communication, etc) 
Volunteers: 
3. Do individual spontaneous volunteers contact your organization? 
 If yes: 
a. How many? 
b. How do you manage these volunteers? 
c. Can you think of a situation where your organisation would be overwhelmed by 
the number of volunteers? 
If no: 
d. How do you plan around untrained spontaneous volunteers acting on their own? 
Donations: 
4. Would your organisation manage any material donations in an emergency? 
 If yes: 
a. How would your organization use material donations in an emergency? 
b. Is there a maximum amount of donations your organization could handle? 
i. Can you think of a situation where your organisation would be 
overwhelmed by donations? 
Groups: 
5. Do you have lists of established community and volunteer organizations in place? 
If yes: 
a. Could you tell us the approximate size of these lists? 
b. We are creating a database of community groups that could help in an emergency 
in Hounslow. Could you tell us what type of information you find helpful to 
record about community and volunteer organisations in your lists? 
c. Could you tell us any major organisations we should contact that could assist us in 
building this database? 
If no:  
55 
 
d. Do you have ties with any voluntary organizations that would help in an 
emergency? 
Communication: 
6. Does your communication with volunteer and community groups typically involve your 
organization instructing the groups, the groups informing your organization of their 
needs, both, or other? 
7. What channels does your organization currently use to communicate with volunteer and 
community groups involved in emergency response? 
For each channel: 
a. Why this channel? 
b. What groups do you communicate with on this channel? 
c. How is this channel used before an emergency? 
d. How is this channel used during an emergency? 
e. How is this channel used after an emergency? 
If not answered above:  
f. Do you typically communicate by direct channels with leaders or by mass 
communication with everyone in the community? 
g. How do you communicate and engage with the community at large? 
Concluding Questions: 
8. What can you tell us about best practice for community engagement? 
9. Can you provide any examples of emergencies where volunteer and donation 
management or community engagement were particularly relevant? 
10. Is there another person in your organization we should talk to find out more about how 
your organization engages with the community and with volunteers? 
11. Is there another government organization that you think effectively engages with the 
community and with volunteers? 
a. Do you know someone we could contact there?  
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Appendix E: Stakeholder Interview Script 
Preamble 
Hello, I am (name). I am part of a team of Worcester Polytechnic Institute students exploring 
how to improve community engagement in Hounslow before, during, and after an emergency. 
We would like to interview you to explore how the borough and the Contingency Planning Unit 
can better engage with your organization and with the community at large. This interview is 
voluntary and you may refuse to answer any questions you wish and stop the interview at any 
time. Can we take notes and record this interview? Do you mind if we quote any portion of this 
interview in our report? If you prefer, we can keep your identity confidential. We will send you 
any quotes for review before finalizing them in our report. 
 
1. Have you interacted with the Contingency Planning Unit (CPU) in the past? 
a. If so, under what circumstances did you interact with the CPU? 
b. What was the reason for the interaction? 
c. How efficient was communication between the CPU and yourself as well as any 
other parties that may have been involved? 
d. Were you satisfied with your interaction with the CPU? 
i. (If no above) What issues arose? 
e. Overall, how would you describe your experience with the CPU? 
i. Is there anything in particular that you liked or disliked? 
ii. Is there anything you would like to see changed? 
iii. What could the CPU have done better? What did they do well? 
2. How can the CPU more effectively engage with your group before an emergency? 
a. Would your organisation like to be included in emergency planning meetings held 
by the CPU? 
b. Would your organisation like to be included in emergency exercises run by the 
CPU? 
c. Do you think members of your organisation would want training and certification 
from the CPU for volunteering during and after emergencies? 
57 
 
d. Are there other ways the CPU could more effectively engage with your group 
before an emergency? 
3. How should emergency control contact your group during an emergency to inform you of 
the situation or request assistance? 
a. Where would you look first for information on a developing emergency? 
b. What method of communication would be best for emergency control to use to 
communicate with your group during an emergency (phone, email, etc.)? 
4. Would your group be willing to assist during or after an emergency by providing 
volunteers, donations, space, or other assets? 
a. If you want to assist, what assets can you offer? 
b. How long would you be willing to supply this asset? 
c. Do you know of other groups that may be providing similar assets? 
d. In an emergency, emergency management and services are often overwhelmed by 
the number of volunteers and donations contributed. If emergency control asked 
your group to not assist in an emergency, would you be willing to? 
e. If you have previously assisted in an emergency, could your assets be used more 
efficiently? 
5. Are there are other groups or emergency services that your group would like to work with 
during or after an emergency that would improve your group’s function? 
a. How could these groups assist you? 
6. Do you have any opinions on how volunteers or donations could be more effectively 
used? 
7. Do you have any emergency protocols within your organisation you would be willing to 
describe to us? 
8. Could you provide any examples of emergencies where you believe management of 
volunteers or donations was done particularly well or particularly poorly? 
9. Do you know of other groups/businesses we could contact? 
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Appendix F: Experts Interviewed 
Table 14: List of Experts Interviewed 
Name Date Organization Expertise 
David McEntire 15/5/2018 Utah Valley 
University 
Professor of Emergency Planning 
Jose Holguín-Veras 15/5/2018 Rensselaer 
Polytechnic 
Institute 
Material Convergence 
Researcher 
Claire Rubin 17/5/2018 Claire B. Rubin 
& Associates, LLC 
Disaster Management Consultant 
Thomas Drabek 24/5/2018 University of 
Denver 
Professor Focused on Group and 
Organizational Responses to 
Disaster 
David Alexander 01/6/2018 University College 
London 
Professor of Risk and Disaster 
Reduction 
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Appendix G: Government Officers Interviewed 
Table 15: List of Government Officers Interviewed 
Name Date Organization Job Title 
Timothy Arnold 15/5/2018 Hounslow CPU Contingency Planning 
Officer 
Dave Turtle 23/5/2018 Metropolitan Police Community and Faith 
Officer 
Joan Conlon 6/6/2018 Hounslow 
Community 
Partnerships Unit 
Community Inclusion 
and Participation 
Manager 
Aine Hayes 6/19/2018 Hounslow 
Community 
Partnerships Unit 
Third Sector 
Partnerships Manager 
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Appendix H: Stakeholders Interviewed 
Table 16: List of Stakeholders Interviewed 
Organization Date Name Category 
All Souls Church 29/5/2018 Richard Frank Faith 
Hounslow Friends of 
Faith 
 
30/5/2018 
Bessie White Faith 
Laxmi Narayan Mandir 4/6/2018 Prem Sondhi Faith 
Hounslow Chamber of 
Commerce 
6/13/2018 Stephen Fry Business 
Groundwork London 6/14/2018 Michael Green Voluntary Group 
Gurdwara Sri Guru 
Singh Sabha 
6/15/2018 Satvinder Singh 
Dadiahla 
Faith 
Hounslow Rotary Club 6/18/2018 Robert Johnson and 
Bridgitte Fauxbert 
Voluntary Group 
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Appendix I: Database Structure 
Along with our recommendations to the Hounslow CPU on improving community 
engagement, another deliverable of this project was a database of voluntary groups willing to 
assist in an emergency. For each organization, the database contains general information about 
the organization, contact details for a specific representative of the organization, and details 
about the resources the organization is willing to provide in an emergency. The resource 
information fields focus on the four resources we identified as particularly important to the CPU 
after reviewing the Emergency Shelter Plan. The fields are shown as they would appear in the 
database in Tables 17, 18, and 19. The “Sample Organization” is a dummy organization to show 
how the information would appear. 
 
Table 17: Database Structure - Organization Information 
Organisation Information 
Organisation 
Name Address Category 
Size (approximate 
number of members) Validated 
Organisation 
Notes 
Sample 
Organization 
Lampton Road, 
London TW3 4DN Voluntary 1 19/6/2018 
A sample 
organization 
 
Table 18: Database Structure - Contact Details 
Contact Details 
Contact Name Email Phone Contact Preference 
John Smith johnsmith@gmail.com 0 00000 00000 email 
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Table 19: Database Structure - Resources 
Resources 
Volunteers Space Vehicles Food Other 
Offered Notes Offered Notes Offered Notes Offered Notes Notes 
Yes 
1 volunteer 
only No  No  No  
Jump rope 
donations offered 
The information recorded in each field is detailed below. 
● Organization Information 
○ Organization Name 
○ Address 
 This is the street address of the organization. 
○ Category 
In this report, we identified three categories of stakeholders that we interviewed: 
business groups, faith groups, and voluntary and community groups. This field is 
one of those categories. 
○ Size 
 This is the approximate number of members the organization has 
○ Validated 
Because it is important to update the database regularly, we record the last time 
the CPU contacted the organization to refresh their database entry here. Format is 
day/month/year for easy use by the CPU. 
○ Other notes 
This field contains notes about the organization as a whole. 
● Contact Details 
These contact details record information for a specific representative of the organization 
to encourage building personal connections between community leaders and the CPU. 
○ Contact Name 
○ Email 
○ Phone Number 
○ Contact Preference 
 Whether the organization representative prefers email or phone contact 
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● Resources 
The resource fields below record whether or not an organization is willing to offer each 
asset and also have the potential to record additional information about each asset. The 
‘offered’ field will be ‘yes’ or ‘no’ based on whether the organization is willing to assist 
in an emergency. The ‘notes’ field can contain any kind of additional notes or limitations; 
for example, the Laxmi Narayan Hindu Mandir is willing to offer space to the CPU, but 
only during the day. 
○ Volunteers 
■ Offered 
■ Notes 
○ Space 
 Space where the CPU could set up an emergency shelter. 
■ Offered 
■ Notes 
○ Vehicles 
The CPU may need to move large numbers of people or things in an emergency. 
This field records whether the organization is willing to transport people or items 
for the CPU by automobile, truck, or similar. 
■ Offered 
■ Notes 
○ Food  
■ Offered 
■ Notes 
○ Other 
Organizations in Hounslow may offer other assets not listed above. This field 
allows the CPU to record any kind of other resource an organization is willing to 
provide. 
 
